When two agents with private information use a mechanism to determine an outcome, what happens when they are free to revise their messages and cannot commit to a mechanism? We study this problem by allowing agents to hold on to a proposed outcome in one mechanism while they play another...

This paper extends the existing theory and empirical investigation of unitization contracts. It highlights the importance of incentive-compatibility and self-enforcement and the bargaining problems faced in achieving viable, long-term contracts. We argue that only if the parties to a unitization...

Some projects require collaboration between two firms. The expected return from such alliance can change over time due to evolving market conditions or arrival of new information. In such cases, when do firms agree to collaborate, and how do they split the profit? To address these questions, the...

This paper extends the existing theory and empirical investigation of unitization contracts. It highlights the importance of incentive-compatibility and self-enforcement and the bargaining problems faced in achieving viable, long-term contracts. We argue that only if the parties to a unitization...

The negotiation and agreement of goals for collaborations between public and non-profit organizations is argued to be a complex and painful process. Thus, the research described in this paper used action research to explore some of the critical behaviours in such groups. Based on the two units...

This paper extends the existing theory and empirical investigation of unitization contracts. It highlights the importance of incentive-compatibility and self-enforcement and the bargaining problems faced in achieving viable, long-term contracts. We argue that only if the parties to a unitization...