Showing 1 - 10 of 50,597
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition …, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong … to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591399
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition …, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong … to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076140
condition is imposed as well, the existence of Nash stable partitions. -- Coalition formation ; Nash stability ; Partitions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731618
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737140
We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition … structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative …, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008823908
This paper studies a noncooperative allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578191
We study coalitional games where the coalitional payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure. We introduce a … noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009613267
We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296159
increasing as a coalition adds to its members. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963352
We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition … structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative …, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013153794