The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in the title and published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, May 2007, Volume 89, Issue 2.

Empirical studies that use self-reported data on remittances to measure the latter''s impact on microeconomic incentives mostly ignore the potential errors associated with reporting/measurement issues. An econometric procedure to control for these errors is developed and applied to...

The paper explicitly models the dynamic strategic aspects of the interaction between the migrant and the remittance-receiving relative(s), with the migrant behaving as a Stackelberg leader. It is also different from other formalizations of remittance behavior in its treatment of the two...

We examine agricultural contracting parties' incentives to employ quality measurement. Quality measurement will be used if on-farm production of ``quality'' is sufficiently cheap, and quality measurement sufficiently informative. We qualitatively test these predictions with empirical observation...

We model a game between two players taking biosecurity actions and characterize the Nash equilibria and their properties for the cases of strategic complements and substitutes. Implications of the theoretical model are investigated using data for biosecurity behavior among producers...

Decision makers are frequently confronted with ambiguous risk information about activities with potential hazards. This may be a result of conflicting risk estimates from multiple sources or ambiguous risk information from a single source. The paper considers processing ambiguous risk...

Empirical studies that use self-reported data on remittances to measure the latter's impact on microeconomic incentives mostly ignore the potential errors associated with reporting/measurement issues. An econometric procedure to control for these errors is developed and applied to...

The paper explicitly models the dynamic strategic aspects of the interaction between the migrant and the remittance-receiving relative(s), with the migrant behaving as a Stackelberg leader. It is also different from other formalizations of remittance behavior in its treatment of the two parties'...

This papers analyzes efficient regulatory design of a polluting firm who has two kinds of private information about its production environment. First, the firm has better information than the regulator regarding technological possibilities for controlling pollution; and second, some aspects of...

We examine interactions among explicit and implicit contracting practices for a sample of 385 intermediaries in California fruit and vegetable markets. Explicit practices are measured with an indicator for the existence of a formal contract, and with indicators for various contract...