We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin … compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a … the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism …

Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often … room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic …

Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often … room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth [25]). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic …

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

This paper empirically studies a decentralized dynamic peer-to-peer matching market. We use data from a leading ride … algorithm can increase the number of matches by making matches less frequently and matching agents more assortatively …

We study matching policies in a dynamic exchange market with random compatibility, in which some agents are easier to …-off between a "thicker market" and quick matching is present in small markets we show that it vanishes in large markets and the … greedy policy nevertheless dominates any other dynamic matching policy. As arrival rate increases the greedy policy matches a …

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks …