Does corporate governance structure matter for firm value? We develop a model in which the allocation of control rights between shareholders and managers (“governance structure”) affects managers' incentive to invest (strong governance tightens managerial freedom and weak governance loosens...

The average maturity of newly issued corporate bonds has declined substantially over the past 40 years, and the traditional determinants of debt maturity fail to explain this decrease fully. We show that the changing composition of the investors in the corporate bond market affects the maturity...

We examine the interaction between the legal protection of investors, corporate governance within firms, institutional development between countries, and investable premia in emerging markets. In a multi country setting and using a novel dataset we find that better-governed firms experience...

We document the role of investors at the periphery of control - "quasi-insiders" - in corporate governance. These agents, who include founders, former CEOs, and other former officers, launch activist campaigns in smaller and worse-performing firms than other activists, and use aggressive tactics...

This study analyzed activism that leads to a merger or acquisition (M&A) of a firm to see its benefits for the shareholders at the target firm as well as its acquirer. It used over thirty years of data to understand the impact of the activists’ demands of strategic significance for the firms....

On May 11-12, 2011, SUERF, the Belgian Financial Forum, the Brussels Finance Institute and the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) jointly organised the 29th SUERF Colloquium New paradigms in money and finance? The papers included in this SUERF Study are based on contributions to the...