The Deposit Guarantee Directive enlarges the role of DGSs in supporting and financing with alternative interventions, the early research of “market solutions” that may avoid the failure of a bank. Despite the broad mandate formally set out in the Directive, the feasibility of the failure...

On 16th November 2009, SUERF, CEPS and the Belgian Financial Forum coorganized a conference "Crisis management at cross-roads" in Brussels. All papers in the present volume are based on contributions at the conference and the SUERF Annual Lecture which followed the event.

We show that a liquidity shock can affect the solvency of a bank and cause its default if the bank does not hold enough liquid assets. The model we propose is an extension of Merton (1974) model and consists of assessing a probability of default over one and two (short) periods relative to the...

This paper analyzes the bail-in tool under the BRRD and predicts that it will not reach its policy objective. To make this argument, this paper first describes the policy rationale that calls for mandatory private sector involvement (PSI). From this analysis, the key features for an effective...

This paper analyzes the bail-in tool under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and predicts that it will not reach its policy objective. To make this argument, this paper first describes the policy rationale that calls for mandatory private sector involvement (PSI). From this...

This paper analyses the bail-in tool under the BRRD and predicts that it will not reach its policy objective. To make this argument, this paper first describes the policy rationale that calls for mandatory private sector involvement (PSI). From this analysis the key features for an effective...

The bail-in tool as implemented in the European bank resolution framework suffers from severe shortcomings. To some extent, the regulatory framework can remedy the impediments to the desirable incentive effect of private sector involvement (PSI) that emanate from a lack of predictability of...

The lack of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) - often referred to as the "third pillar" of Banking Union - has been criticized since the inception of the EU Banking Union. The Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) framework needs to rely heavily on banks' internal loss...

The lack of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) - often referred to as the 'third pillar' of Banking Union - has been criticized since the inception of the EU Banking Union. The Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) framework needs to rely heavily on banks' internal loss...

We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision making procedure of the Single Resolution...