This study investigates the effect of internal reporting environment openness and organizational identification on managers’ budgetary misreporting. Using an experiment, we find that organizational identification moderates the effect of internal reporting environments on misreporting. That is,...

Managers can set explicit, binding targets to reward workers before observing their performance (ex ante contract), or decide whether to reward workers after observing their performance (ex post contract). We experimentally examine the effects of the two types of contracts on workers' behaviors...

This study examines the effect on investors' judgments of corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures when integrated with financial information in a single report versus when presented in a separate CSR report. Advocates for integrated reports argue that CSR information will be perceived as...

This study examines the joint effect that probabilistic audits and compensation interdependence have on misreporting. In an experiment that holds the true detection rate equal, I find participants perceive a probabilistic audit to be more effective (i.e., more likely to detect misreporting) when...

Using an online survey of 468 U.S. employees from diverse industries and professions, we provide empirical evidence that management control system design choices can affect autonomous motivation in employees. Drawing on self-determination theory and the levers of control framework, we predict...

The process of having supervisors discuss, compare, justify, and potentially adjust their subordinates' performance ratings in a meeting with their peer supervisors is referred to as peer-level calibration. Although calibration committees are widely used, there is considerable debate about their...

This study investigates how the distribution of task properties feedback interacts with goal-contingent pay in a complex task. We experimentally examine how task properties feedback with identical content influences performance when employees receive the feedback either evenly throughout a task...

Managers often face the choice between promoting an internal employee and hiring an external candidate. Using an incentivized experiment, we examine managers’ promote/hire decision and employees’ behavior before and after that decision in a setting in which the external candidate has...

While managers commonly possess private information regarding future production cost when developing their cost budget, they also face outcome uncertainty regarding that future cost. This outcome uncertainty, however, has largely been ignored by experimental researchers examining various...

We examine theoretically and experimentally how combining between-team and within-team incentives affects behavior in team tournaments. Theory predicts that free-riding is likely to occur when there are only between-team incentives, and offering within-team incentives may solve this problem....