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We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance, and how a team chooses between alternative mechanisms. We study a group incentive mechanism, where team output is shared equally among team members, and a hierarchical mechanism team output is allocated...
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This paper provides a theoretical model for explaining the separation of ownership and control in firms. An entrepreneur hires a worker, whose effort is necessary for running a project. The worker's effort determines the probability that the project will be completed on time, but the worker...
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misalignment between managers and the firm, these two purposes are in conflict. This is because the worker with the largest private …: employees that create lower expected profits as managers have yet better promotion prospects. That finding still holds when the … firm owner optimally chooses the promotion rule, the degree of delegation, and wage payments to both employees and managers …
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leads foreign entrepreneurs to place little reliance on formal contracts in their dealings with local agent managers … industry growth creates a substantial ‘shadow of the future,’ where managers’ outside employment options are relatively limited …
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Workers do not directly observe their output in many organizational settings. Employers benefit from this, as a less informed worker is cheaper to motivate to repeatedly exert effort. In this environment, monitoring a worker's output is costly if it informs him of his own performance and, thus,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011808020
Many firms use relative stock performance to evaluate and incentivize their CEOs. We provide evidence that these firms routinely disclose information that harms peers’ stock prices. Consistent with deliberate sabotage, peer-harming disclosures appear to be aimed at the peers whose stock price...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210880
This study examines whether and how the extraversion of a firm’s key executives influences its provision and the properties of management earnings forecasts. We provide evidence that firms with extraverted chief financial officers (CFOs) are more likely to have a greater level of voluntary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220642