We propose adding a third,intermediate,verdict to the two-verdict used in criminal trials. We show that the additional verdict can be used to distinguish between convicted defendants, based on the residual doubt regarding their guilt at the end of the trial, in a way that improves welfare and...

We propose adding a third,intermediate,verdict to the two-verdict used in criminal trials. We show that the additional verdict can be used to distinguish between convicted defendants, based on the residual doubt regarding their guilt at the end of the trial, in a way that improves welfare and...

How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiationproofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency...

How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiation-proofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency...

What does contract negotiation look like when some parties hold private information and negotiation frictions are negligible? This paper analyzes the above question and provides a foundation for renegotiation-proof contracts in a related environment. The model extends the framework of the Coase...

Many facts are learned through the intermediation of individuals with special access to information, such as law enforcement officers, officials with a security clearance, or experts with specific knowledge. This paper considers whether societies can learn about such facts when information is...