We consider a dynamic pricing problem where a firm sells one item to a single buyer in order to maximize expected revenues. The firm commits to a price function over an infinite horizon. The buyer arrives at some random time with a private value for the item. He is more impatient than the seller...

Dynamic resource allocation problems arise under a variety of settings and have been studied across disciplines such as Operations Research and Computer Science. The present paper introduces a unifying model for a very large class of dynamic optimization problems, that we call dynamic resource...

We consider the problem in which n items arrive to a market sequentially over time, where two agents compete to choose the best possible item. When an agent selects an item, he leaves the market and obtains a payoff given by the value of the item, which is represented by a random variable...

We present a short, geometric proof for the price-of-anarchy results that have recently been established in a series of papers on selfish routing in multicommodity flow networks and on nonatomic congestion games. This novel proof also facilitates two new types of theoretical results: On the one...

This article studies a principal-agent problem with discrete outcome and effort level spaces. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and the latter is subject to limited liability. We consider the ratio between the first-best social welfare and the social welfare arising from the...

An important problem in electronic commerce is that of finding optimal pricing mechanisms to sell a single item when the number of buyers is random and they arrive over time. In this paper we combine ideas from auction theory and recent work on pricing with strategic consumers to derive the...

We discuss the problem of sequencing precedence-constrained jobs on a single machine to minimize the average weighted completion time. This problem has attracted much attention in the mathematical programming community since Sidney's pioneering work in 1975. We look at the problem from a...

We consider network games with atomic players, which indicates that some players control a positive amount of flow. Instead of studying Nash equilibria as previous work has done, we consider that players with considerable market power will make decisions before the others because they can...

Deciding how to allocate the seats of a house of representatives is one of the most fundamental problems in the political organization of societies, and has been widely studied over already two centuries. The idea of proportionality is at the core of most approaches to tackle this problem, and...

In the traffic assignment problem, commuters select the shortest available path to travel from a given origin to a given destination. This system has been studied for over 50 years since Wardrop's seminal work. Motivated by freight companies, which need to ship goods across the network, we study...