stronger. We then study how different governance structures impact the ability to sustain integrity as a corporate value. We …

In this paper we investigate central bank accountability by looking at the effect of transparency in a simple monetary … policy game with an overriding mechanism. Monetary policy is transparent if there is little uncertainty about the central …'s accountability. The paper shows that transparency leads to a lower expected rate of inflation and less stabilization of supply shocks. …

. Centralization allows benefits from policy coordination but has costs in terms of diminished accountability, which can be precisely … following the Tiebout model of local public goods, which analyses the merits of the differentiation of policy by locality but …

wasteful projects are often attributed to weak mechanisms of accountability, such as inadequate opportunities for voters to … wasteful spending may be a by-product of the accountability of politicians to their voters, not a symptom of its weakness or … aid rules, the subsidy provisions of the World Trade Organization, or the conditionality of loans from the World Bank and …

The paper incorporates three institutional design features into a Kydland-Prescott, Barro-Gordon monetary policy game … they perceive public scrutiny (accountability) as intrusive. Combining these findings implies that both goal …-transparency and accountability will be negatively related to goal-independence for which we present empirical support using …

Central bank transparency has become the topic of a lively public and academic debate on monetary policy. Unfortunately … proposes a comprehensive index for central bank transparency that comprises the political, economic, procedural, policy and …

of fiscal policy when faced with rigid monetary objectives. None of the attempts in the literature to measure these … correlations allow for a changing fiscal role. As monetary policy is handled by an independent authority, fiscal and wage …

cooperative monetary and fiscal policy. Central bank operational independence precludes substantive accountability; it is …, practically uninteresting special case. New-Keynesian DSGE models imply that optimal monetary policy implements the Bailey … gap volatility in the monetary policy maker's objective function. Operational independence of the central bank is limited …

monetary policy. Using a standard theoretical model where there are also opportunities for fiscal intervention, we argue that … partial, but strictly limited substitute for accountability. …

unwieldy to deliver a good policy mix and permit adequate accountability. One money is hardly compatible with eleven …