Supplementary Appendix to "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives."The paper "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives" to which these Appendices apply is available at the following URL: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2700821" http://ssrn.com/abstract=2700821

Previous articles on the transfer problem pay scant attention to the problems caused by the distortionary taxation that extracts the gift from the donor nation or the cut in distortionary taxation that bestows the gift to the recipient nation. When combined with inflexibility in the real wage...

Capital reallocation is procyclical in the data, but countercyclical in standard business-cycle models. To solve this puzzle, I build a model of endogenous partial irreversibility, with heterogeneous firms facing aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Used investment goods are...

Historical anecdotes of new investors being drawn into a booming asset market, only to suffer when the market turns, abound. While the role of investor contagion in asset bubbles has been explored extensively in the theoretical literature, causal empirical evidence on the topic is virtually...

In 2007, Michigan began requiring all high school students to take the ACT college entrance exam. This natural experiment allows us to evaluate the performance of several parametric and semiparametric sample selection correction models. We apply each model to the censored, prepolicy test score...

We propose a theory of optimal fiscal policy consistent with the observation that governments typically inherit their predecessors' plans and formulate their policies over a finite future horizon. We use this framework, which we call “Limited-Time Commitment" (LTC), to make two contributions....

We propose a model of charity competition in which informed giving alone can explain quality heterogeneity across similar charities. It is this heterogeneity that also creates the demand for information. In equilibrium, too few donors pay to be informed; but interestingly, informed giving may...

Charities frequently rely on professional solicitors whose commissions exceed half of total donations. To understand this practice, we propose a principal-agent model in which the charity optimally offers a higher commission to a more “efficient” solicitor, raising the price of giving...

In fall 1935, Abraham Wald presented an existence proof for a general equilibrium of exchange model to Karl Menger's Mathematical Colloquium in Vienna. Due to limited space, the paper could not be printed in the eighth proceedings of the Colloquium (the Ergebnisse) published in spring 1937 but...

We investigate information aggregation and competition in a delegationframework. An uninformed principal is unable to perform a task herself andmust choose between one of two biased and imperfectly informed experts. Inthe focal equilibrium, experts exaggerate their biases, anticipating...