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Equity versus efficiency? : evidence from three-person generosity experiments

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; Bäker, … - In: Games 1 (2010) 2, pp. 89-102

In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751380

The influence of priming on reference states

Matthey, Astrid - In: Games 1 (2010) 1, pp. 34-52

outcomes of either the individual herself or her reference group. The experiment described in this paper suggests that, in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751388

Spite and reciprocity in auctions

Nishimura, Naoko; Cason, Timothy N.; Saijō, Tatsuyoshi; … - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 365-411

The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752417

What behaviors are disapproved? : experimental evidence from five dictator games

López-Pérez, Raúl; Vorsatz, Marc - In: Games 3 (2012) 2, pp. 78-96

The literature on social norms has often stressed that social disapproval is crucial to foster compliance with norms and promote fair and cooperative behavior. With this in mind, we explore the disapproval of allocation decisions using experimental data from five dictator games with a feedback...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752852

Bimodal bidding in experimental all-pay auctions

Ernst, Christiane; Thöni, Christian - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 608-623

We report results from experimental first-price, sealed-bid, all-pay auctions for a good with a common and known value. We observe bidding strategies in groups of two and three bidders and under two extreme information conditions. As predicted by the Nash equilibrium, subjects use mixed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240829

Punishment, cooperation, and cheater detection in "noisy" social exchange

Bornstein, Gary; Weisel, Ori - In: Games 1 (2010) 1, pp. 18-33

Explaining human cooperation in large groups of non-kin is a major challenge to both rational choice theory and the theory of evolution. Recent research suggests that group cooperation can be explained by positing that cooperators can punish non-cooperators or cheaters. The experimental evidence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751389

The minority of three-game : an experimental and theoretical analysis

Chmura, Thorsten; Güth, Werner - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 333-354

We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752419

Voluntary versus enforced team effort

Keser, Claudia; Montmarquette, Claude - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 277-301

We present a model where each of two players chooses between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the equilibrium strategy to choose private remuneration, we frequently observe both players to choose team remuneration in a series of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752421

A choice prediction competition for a social preferences in simple extensive form games : an introduction

Ert, Eyal; Erev, Ido; Roth, Alvin E. - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 257-276

and the other on predicting the choices of the second mover. The competitions are based on an estimation experiment and a … competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly selected from the … same distribution. The current introductory paper presents the results of the estimation experiment, and clarifies the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752422

Market entry prediction competition 2010

Hariskos, Wasilios; Leder, Johannes; Teodorescu, Kinneret - In: Games 2 (2011) 2, pp. 200-208

We submitted three models to the competition which were based on the I-SAW model. The models introduced four new assumptions. In the first model an adjustment process was introduced through which the tendency for exploration was higher at the beginning and decreased over time in the exploration...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752428