Showing 1 - 7 of 7
In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751380
and the other on predicting the choices of the second mover. The competitions are based on an estimation experiment and a … competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly selected from the … same distribution. The current introductory paper presents the results of the estimation experiment, and clarifies the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752422
We study behavior in a moonlighting game with unequal initial endowments. In this game, predictions for second-mover behavior based on inequality aversion are in contrast to reciprocity. We find that inequality aversion explains only few observations. The comparison to a treatment with equal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752450
This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both the one-shot and the infinitely repeated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We show that fairness concerns operate as a ”substitute” for time discounting in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752853
This paper addresses the role of affect and emotions in shaping the behavior of responders in the ultimatum game. A huge amount of research shows that players do not behave in an economically rational way in the ultimatum game, and emotional mechanisms have been proposed as a possible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752872
This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity–or respect–towards their competitors. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753710
We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich et al. [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian principle)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754116