We assign a probabilistic evaluation to a firm as a measure, in the form of a probability distribution over [0,1], of the quality of the firm’s products. When two firms compete to develop a new product, a prospective investor can use the two evaluations to determine which firm is likely to...

This paper studies welfare tradeoffs in two-sided, one-to-one matching markets. We begin by providing theoretical upper bounds on a utilitarian price of stability, and show that these bounds vary with the composition of participants’ ordinal preference lists. We then turn to simulation...

A simple head-to-head voting scheme in which voters hold complete and transitive preferences over alternatives generates all binary relations on finite sets. The minimal number of voters required to generate a binary relation provides a measure of complexity for binary relations. Complexity so...

Two forms of continuity are defined for Pareto representations of preferences. They are designated “continuityâ€\x9D and “coordinate continuity.â€\x9D Characterizations are given of those Pareto representable preferences that are continuously representable and, in dimension...

A preference profile has a one-dimensional Euclidean representation if it can be derived from an arrangement of individuals and alternatives on a line, with each individual preferring the nearer of each pair of alternatives. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that determines whether a given...