This study investigates the associations among bank risk-taking, ownership concentration, and the recently proposed standard for capital stability (Basel III). Consistent with theory, the evidence shows that a rise in ownership concentration by one standard deviation increases the extent of...

We study the impact of political institutions on foreign firms’ choice of their U.S. cross-listing venue. Using two measures of the quality of political institutions (the political rights index and the political constraint index) and controlling for various firm-level and country-level...

We investigate whether cross-listing in the US contributes to impound more earnings information into stock prices. Our results indicate that US exchange cross-listings are not associated with more future earnings news reflected in current prices, in accord with the view that such mechanism does...

We examine the role of cross-listing in alleviating domestic market constraints and facilitating mergers and acquisitions. Our results show that cross-listing allows shareholders of target firms to extract higher takeover premiums relative to their non-cross-listed peers. Moreover, shareholders...

We test the impact of corporate governance effects on the stock price volatility of the DAX100 and find that these variables increase the volatility and decrease the error terms statistically significant. In addition, controlling for contemporaneous and next period's movements, we find that...

We analyze cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) in the context of growth options by investigating the shareholder wealth effects of acquirers and targets and changes in financial analysts’ earnings forecasts for acquiring firms announcing CBAs. Our sample of 16,435 global CBAs over the 1984–2008...

Non-U.S. firms can converge toward U.S. capital market and legal regulations by cross-listing in the U.S. or by being acquired by a U.S. bidder. We show companies that are smaller, have lower growth opportunities, are capital intensive, and benefit from bonding through compliance with U.S....

This study examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on non-shareholding stakeholders. We find that managers tend to focus different levels of attention on specific non-shareholding stakeholders relative to their level of entrenchment. When managers have greater protection, they tend to...

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998–2009 is empirically tested. It supports...

We examine 136 M&A deals from 1997 to 2007 initiated by Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, where the acquirer gains complete control of the target. Our data shows that the Chinese M&A market is dominated by domestic deals with unlisted targets that are either...