A rule for 3-way division of profits based on peer evaluation reports is impartial if the calculation of each partner's share ignores her report, exact if it never allocates more or less than the profit to be shared, and consensual if it respects evaluations when the partners' reports are in...

This paper studies welfare tradeoffs in two-sided, one-to-one matching markets. We begin by providing theoretical upper bounds on a utilitarian price of stability, and show that these bounds vary with the composition of participants’ ordinal preference lists. We then turn to simulation...

Two forms of continuity are defined for Pareto representations of preferences. They are designated “continuityâ€\x9D and “coordinate continuity.â€\x9D Characterizations are given of those Pareto representable preferences that are continuously representable and, in dimension...

In two-sided matching markets, stability can be costly. We define social welfare functions for matching markets and use them to formulate a definition of the price of stability. We then show that it is common to find a price tag attached to stability, and that the price of stability can be...