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Bebchuk, Lucian; Goldstein, Itay - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2010

This paper develops a model of a self-fulfilling credit market freeze and uses it to study alternative governmental responses to such a crisis. We study an economy in which operating firms are interdependent, with their success depending on the ability of other operating firms to obtain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008635935

Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns

Bebchuk, Lucian; Cohen, Alma; Wang, Charles C.Y. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2010

In an important and influential work, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) show that a trading strategy based on an index of 24 governance provisions (G-Index) would have earned abnormal returns during the 1991-1999 period, and this intriguing finding has attracted much attention ever since it was...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008631671

Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate

Bebchuk, Lucian; Cohen, Alma - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2002

This paper empirically investigates the decisions of publicly traded firms where to incorporate. We study the features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms and the characteristics of firms that determine whether they incorporate in or out of their state of location. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005710477

The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers

Bebchuk, Lucian - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2002

This paper argues that once undistorted shareholder choice is ensured -- which can be done by making it necessary for hostile bidders to win a vote of shareholder support -- boards should not have veto power over takeover bids. The paper considers all of the arguments that have been offered for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005710800

The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy

Bebchuk, Lucian; IV, John C. Coates; Subramanian, Guhan - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2002

emerges, to wait at least one year to gain control of the board and (ii) requiring such a bidder to win two elections far …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005714354

The Overlooked Corporate Finance Problems of a Microsoft Breakup

Bebchuk, Lucian; Walker, David I. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2001

This paper identifies problems with the ordered breakup of Microsoft that seem to have been completely overlooked by the government, the judge, and the commentators. The breakup order prohibits Bill Gates and other large Microsoft shareholders from owning shares in both of the companies that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005714610

The Costs of Entrenched Boards

Bebchuk, Lucian; Cohen, Alma - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2004

This paper investigates empirically how the value of publicly traded firms is overall affected by arrangements protecting management from removal. A majority of U.S. public companies have staggered boards that substantially insulate the board from removal via a hostile takeover or a proxy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005718712

Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

Bebchuk, Lucian; Hart, Oliver D. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2001

This paper evaluates the primary mechanisms for changing management or obtaining control in publicly traded …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005720139

The Market for Corporate Law

Bar-Gill, Oren; Barzuza, Michal; Bebchuk, Lucian - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 162 (2006) 1, pp. 134-160

This paper develops a model of the competition among states in providing corporate law rules. Such competition is shown to produce optimal rules with respect to issues that do not have a substantial effect on management's private benefits but not with respect to issues that have such an effect....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823382

Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Seperating Control from Cash Flow Rights

Bebchuk, Lucian; Kraakman, Reinier; Triantis, George - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 1999

This paper examines common arrangements for separating control from cash flow rights: stock pyramids, cross … group to maintain a complete lock on the control of a company while holding less than a majority of the cash flow rights …. Finally, we put forward an agenda for research concerning structures separating control from cash flow rights. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828584