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Kos, Nenad - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 642-650

We examine a model of limited communication in which the seller is selling a single good to two potential buyers. In each of the finite number of periods the seller asks one of the two buyers a binary question. After the final answer, the allocation and the transfers are executed. The model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931199

Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Nisan, Noam - Elsevier

Mechanism design is a subfield of game theory that aims to design games whose equilibria have desired properties such as achieving high efficiency or high revenue. Algorithmic mechanism design is a subfield that lies on the border of mechanism design and computer science and deals with mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255422

Comparing finite mechanisms

Hurwicz, Leonid; Marschak, Thomas - In: Economic Theory 21 (2003) 4, pp. 783-841

This paper obtains finite analogues to propositions that a previous literature obtained about the informational efficiency of mechanisms whose possible messages form a continuum. Upon reaching an equilibrium message, to which all persons “agree”, a mechanism obtains an action appropriate to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753446

Finite allocation mechanisms: approximate Walrasian versus approximate Direct Revelation

Hurwicz, Leonid; Marschak, Thomas - In: Economic Theory 21 (2003) 2, pp. 545-572

This paper obtains finite counterparts of previous results that showed the informational efficiency of the Walrasian mechanism among all mechanisms yielding Pareto-optimal individually rational trades in exchange economies while using a continuum of possible messages. In particular, we develop...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597807

The communication burden of payment determination

Babaioff, Moshe; Blumrosen, Liad; Schapira, Michael - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 153-167

In the presence of self-interested parties, mechanism designers typically aim to implement some social-choice function in an equilibrium. This paper studies the cost of such equilibrium requirements in terms of communication. While a certain amount of information x needs to be communicated just...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603336

Communication and efficiency in auctions

Kos, Nenad - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 233-249

We study auctions under restricted communication. Agents have valuations distributed over an interval but can only report one of a finite number of messages. We provide necessary conditions for welfare as well as revenue maximizing auctions in the independent private values case when bidders...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573658

Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining

Zhang, Jun; Wang, Ruqu - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 2096-2123

In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042941

Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations

Zhang, Jun - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (2013) 5, pp. 452-461

This paper examines the optimal mechanism design problem when buyers have uncertain valuations. This uncertainty can only be resolved after the actual transactions take place and upon incurring significant post-purchase cost. We focus on two different settings regarding how the seller values a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011051634

Discount Pricing

Armstrong, Mark; Chen, Yongmin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

options, and there is less incentive to search. We also discuss a behavioral model where the propensity to buy increases when …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083448

Search Costs, Demand-Side Economies and the Incentives to Merge under Bertrand Competition

Moraga-González, José-Luis; Petrikaite, Vaiva - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

search sequentially for satisfactory deals. In the pre-merger symmetric equilibrium, consumers visit firmsrandomly. However … non-merging stores, and only when they do not find a satisfactory product there they visit the merging firms. As search … products of the constituent firms, which generates sizable search economies. We show that such demand-side economies can confer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083482