Similar Search Results

The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

Jaume, Daniel; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - In: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 76 (2012) 2, pp. 161-187

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of potentially many different goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011000016

The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

Jaume, Daniel; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - In: Computational Statistics 76 (2012) 2, pp. 161-187

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010759599

On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - In: Journal of Economic Theory 154 (2014) C, pp. 187-215

-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty set of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076674

Matching markets under (in)complete information

Ehlers, Lars H.; Massó, Jordi - In: Journal of economic theory 157 (2015), pp. 295-314

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011525263

A modified Taylor rule for dealing with demand shocks and uncertain potential macroeconomic output

Alvarez-Ramirez, Jose; Ibarra-Valdez, Carlos; … - In: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 387 (2008) 5, pp. 1283-1300

establish the stability properties of the resulting control system. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010874309

Matching markets under (in)complete information

Ehlers, Lars; Massó, Jordi - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 295-314

We introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). We show that given a common...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263590

On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles

Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; … - In: International Journal of Game Theory 36 (2008) 3, pp. 497-518

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755744

Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Massó, Jordi - In: Review of Economic Design 11 (2007) 3, pp. 175-184

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178690

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejdanro; … - In: International Journal of Game Theory 33 (2004) 1, pp. 115-128

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q−separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. Therefore, in centralized markets like entry-level professional labor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598456

Some issues on the stability of trading based on technical analysis

Alvarez-Ramirez, Jose; Fernandez-Anaya, Guillermo; … - In: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 337 (2004) 3, pp. 609-624

Some stability effects of technical trading on financial/commodity markets are analyzed in this paper. Technical … equation, whose (local) stability is determined by means of root-locus techniques. It is proven that the larger the time …-delay horizon, the larger the stability margin. This means that short-run technical trading is more likely to induce market …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010590356