We extend the persuasion game to bring it squarely into the economics of advertising. We model advertising as exciting … consumer interest into learning more about the product, and determine a firm's equilibrium choice of advertising content over … quality information, price information, and horizontal match information. Equilibrium is unique whenever advertising is …

analyse a monopoly firm’s choice of advertising content and the information disclosed to consumers. The firm advertises only …

, magazines, newspapers, the Internet, and television (the illustrative example henceforth). Most advertising expenditures are … incurred for these media. They are also mainly supported by advertising revenue. Early work stressed possible market failures … sides are coordinated by broadcasters (or 'platforms') that choose ad levels and program types, and advertising finances the …

advertising expands: others lose ad market share but may increase in absolute terms if sufficiently attractive. The "information … total ad volume reaches an upper limit. Overall, advertising is excessive, though the allocation across sectors is optimal …

We study personalized price competition with costly advertising among n quality-cost differentiated firms. Strategies …-like" profits. Welfare losses initially rise then fall with the ad cost, with losses due to excessive advertising and sales by the …

We model comparative advertising as brands pushing up own brand perception and pulling down the brand image of targeted … the structural model. These attack matrices identify diversion ratios and hence comparative advertising damage measures …. We find that outgoing comparative advertising attacks are half as powerful as self-promotion in raising own perceived …