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Employees’ performance evaluation has been generalized in companies but biased reviews and misreporting may impair its quality. In our experiment workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers’ performance to the experimenter. We find that more than one third of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594586
With a market entry game inspired by Camerer and Lovallo (1999), we study the attitudes of junior and senior employees towards strategic uncertainty and competition. Seniors exhibit higher entry rates compared to juniors, especially when the market capacity is not too low or when earnings from...
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Evidence from an experiment investigating the "house money effect" in the context of a public goods game is reconsidered. Analysis is performed within the framework of the panel hurdle model, in which subjects are assumed to be one of two types: free-riders, and potential contributors. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569530
We use survey and experimental data to explore how effort choices and preferences for redis-tribution are linked. Under standard preferences, redistribution would reduce effort. This is different with social preferences. Using data from the World Value Survey, we find that respondents with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535064
In major legal orders such as UK, the U.S., Germany, and France, bribers and recipients face equally severe criminal sanctions. In contrast, countries like China, Russia, and Japan treat the briber more mildly. Given these differences between symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009487845
If two players of a simultaneous symmetric one-shot prisoner's dilemma hold standard prefer-ences, the fact that choosing the cooperative move imposes harm on a passive outsider is imma-terial. Yet if participants hold social preferences, one might think that they are reticent to impose harm on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490177
We conduct a real-effort experiment where participants choose between individual compensation and team-based pay. In contrast to tournaments, which are often avoided by women, we find that women choose team-based pay at least as frequently as men in all our treatments and conditions, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212812