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When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
Kojima, Fuhito - In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 7 (2007) 1
In two-sided matching markets, stable mechanisms are vulnerable to various kinds of manipulations. This paper investigates conditions for the student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM) and the college-optimal stable mechanism (COSM) to be immune to manipulations via capacities and pre-arranged...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014589150
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Implementing maximum likelihood estimation of empirical matching models : MPEC versus NFXP
Dong, Baiyu; Hsieh, Yu-Wei; Zhang, Xing - In: Computational economics 59 (2022) 1, pp. 71-102
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013168922
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Designing matching mechanisms under constraints : an approach from discrete convex analysis
Kojima, Fuhito; Tamura, Akihisa; Yokoo, Makoto - In: Journal of economic theory 176 (2018), pp. 803-833
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980930
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Matching with ownership
Combe, Julien - In: Journal of mathematical economics 98 (2022), pp. 1-12
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013365091
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When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
Kojima, Fuhito - In: Contributions to Theoretical Economics 7 (2007) 1, pp. 1405-1405
In two-sided matching markets, stable mechanisms are vulnerable to various kinds of manipulations. This paper investigates conditions for the student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM) and the college-optimal stable mechanism (COSM) to be immune to manipulations via capacities and pre-arranged...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005458970