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Evans, George W.; Honkapohja, Seppo - In: Handbook of macroeconomics : volume 1, part A, (pp. 449-542). 1999

This chapter provides a survey of the recent work on learning in the context of macroeconomics. Learning has several … roles. First, it provides a boundedly rational model of how rational expectations can be achieved. Secondly, learning acts … as a selection device in models with multiple REE (rational expectations equilibria). Third, the learning dynamics …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024243

Learning when to say no

Evans, David; Evans, George W.; McGough, Bruce - In: Journal of economic theory 194 (2021), pp. 1-33

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012807331

Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics

Evans, George W. - 2001

explanatory power to a variety of expectation formation models by focusing on the learning factor. Whereas the rational …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014488602

Estimation of the house money effect using hurdle models

Engel, Christoph; Moffat, Peter G. - 2012

Evidence from an experiment investigating the "house money effect" in the context of a public goods game is reconsidered. Analysis is performed within the framework of the panel hurdle model, in which subjects are assumed to be one of two types: free-riders, and potential contributors. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569530

Effort and redistribution : better cousins than one might have thought

Buch, Claudia M.; Engel, Christoph - 2012

We use survey and experimental data to explore how effort choices and preferences for redis-tribution are linked. Under standard preferences, redistribution would reduce effort. This is different with social preferences. Using data from the World Value Survey, we find that respondents with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535064

Symmetric vs. asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery

Engel, Christoph; Goerg, Sebastian J.; Yu, Gaoneng - 2012

In major legal orders such as UK, the U.S., Germany, and France, bribers and recipients face equally severe criminal sanctions. In contrast, countries like China, Russia, and Japan treat the briber more mildly. Given these differences between symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009487845

Harm on an innocent outsider as a lubricant of cooperation : an experiment

Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2012

If two players of a simultaneous symmetric one-shot prisoner's dilemma hold standard prefer-ences, the fact that choosing the cooperative move imposes harm on a passive outsider is imma-terial. Yet if participants hold social preferences, one might think that they are reticent to impose harm on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490177

Demand Reduction and Pre-emptive Bidding in Multi-Unit License Auctions

Goeree, Jacob K.; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for pre-emptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497722

On the Importance of Default Breach Remedies

Sloof, Randolph; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sonnemans, Joep - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 163 (2007) 1, pp. 5-22

Theory predicts that default breach remedies are immaterial whenever contracting costs are negligible. Some experimental studies, however, suggest that in practice default rules do matter, as they may affect parties' preferences over contract terms. This paper presents results from an experiment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582074

The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: An experiment

Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 573-594

We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After having gained experience with two payoff variations of the trust game, subjects in the final part explicitly choose which of these two variants to play. Theory predicts that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573646