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Endogenous community formation and collective provision – A procedurally fair mechanism

Güth, Werner - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 (2014) C, pp. 389-395

A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness, we derive a bidding mechanism determining endogenously who participates in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116861

Reciprocity in locating contributions : experiments on the neighborhood public good game

Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Schosser, Stephan - In: Games 4 (2013) 2, pp. 144-162

In repeated public good experiments, reciprocity helps to sustain high levels of cooperation. Can this be achieved by … location. This mechanism of individually targeted sanctions helps to foster initial cooperation. It decreases over time …, however. Location choices are used to reciprocate, but may not suffice to stabilize voluntary cooperation as an effect …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754770

Providing revenue-generating projects under a fair mechanism: An experimental analysis

Güth, Werner; Koukoumelis, Anastasios; Levati, M. Vittoria - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 (2014) C, pp. 410-419

mechanism is efficiency enhancing. Our experiment tests whether the mechanism remains conducive to efficiency when revenue …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116845

Rules (of Bidding) to Generate Equal Stated Profits: An Axiomatic Approach

Güth, Werner - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 167 (2011) 4, pp. 608-612

Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids, which, together with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421918

Would you mind if I get more? An experimental study of the envy game

Casal, Sandro; Güth, Werner; Jia, Mofei; Ploner, Matteo - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84 (2012) 3, pp. 857-865

Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimentally study the impact of envy in a bargaining setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the size of the pie to be shared with a responder, whose share...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048077

Is regulation by milestones efficiency enhancing? An experimental study of environmental protection

Freytag, Andreas; Güth, Werner; Koppel, Hannes; … - In: European Journal of Political Economy 33 (2014) C, pp. 71-84

our experiment, a cumulative threshold public goods game, milestones are captured by intermediate contribution targets on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056290

Endogenous price leadership – A theoretical and experimental analysis

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; Zaby, … - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 (2014) C, pp. 420-432

We present a model of price leadership on homogeneous product markets where the price leader is selected endogenously. The price leader sets and guarantees a sales price to which followers adjust according to their individual supply functions. The price leader clears the market by serving the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116870

Does Procedural Fairness Crowd Out Other-Regarding Concerns? A Bidding Experiment

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 169 (2013) 3, pp. 433-450

-regarding concerns. Here, we investigate procedural fairness as in Güth (2011). In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010903173

Voluntary versus Compulsory Solidarity: Theory and Experiment

Güth, Werner; Sutter, Matthias; Verbon, Harrie - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 162 (2006) 2, pp. 347-363

We present an overlapping-generations model with two interacting teams, where young team members earn an income, whereas old team members depend on either intrateam transfers from young members (voluntary solidarity) or tax-financed transfers (compulsory solidarity). We derive the individually...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005764388

Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: A theoretical and experimental analysis

Güth, Werner; Vittoria Levati, M.; Montinari, Natalia - In: European Journal of Political Economy 34 (2014) C, pp. 206-221

We apply a procedurally fair rule to a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056275