Economic theory points to five parties active in disciplining management of poorly performing firms: holders of large share blocks, acquirers of new blocks, bidders in take-overs, non-executive directors, and investors during periods of financial distress. This Paper reports the first...

This paper investigates the governance structure choices of firms when there is competition between legal systems. We study the impact of the allocation of control over choice of governance and reincorporation on firms’ technologies and technological specialization of countries in the context...

Public ownership is viewed as a restriction on the portfolio of equities held by investors. Three conditions are required to justify such restrictions. First, monitoring and coordination create concentration in supply or demand. Second, complete contracts must be infeasible or undesirable....

This paper evaluates relations between industrial activity and the structure of countries' financial, ownership and legal systems. Using data on 27 industries in 14 OECD countries over the period 1970 to 1995, we evaluate whether the structure of countries' systems is associated with different...

Flow of funds data are used to compare methods of financing the corporate sector in five countries over the period 1970-85. Many of the problems associated with previous studies of corporate finance are avoided by defining financing proportions in net terms. The degree of consolidation of...

This paper compares corporate financing in the German bank-based and UK market-based systems. Large German firms pay out a lower proportion of their profits as dividends and finance a larger proportion of their investments from retentions. German banks extend more long-term finance to...