non-cooperative way how much crime effort they will exert. We show that the Nash equilibrium crime effort of each … criminal who, once removed, leads to the maximum reduction in aggregate crime. We provide a geometric characterization of the … generalizes the key player for a group of criminals of a given size. We finally endogeneize the crime participation decision …

friends with other criminals (by learning and acquiring proper know-how in the crime business). We first study the Nash … show that multiple equilibria with different number of active criminals and levels of involvement in crime activities may … formation and crime decisions game. We show that the multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes holds even when we allow for …

We study peer effects in crime by analyzing co-offending networks. We first provide a credible estimate of peer effects … criminal from each network that reduces total crime by the largest amount. Using longitudinal data, we are able to compare the … disappeared over time, we show that the theoretical predicted crime reduction is close to what is observed in the real world. We …