In this paper we analyze the evolution of firm efficiency in the Czech Republic. Using a large panel of more than 190,000 Czech firm/years we study whether firms fully utilize their resources, how firm efficiency evolves over time, and how firm efficiency is determined by ownership structure. We...

Drawing upon key arguments of prevailing theoretical perspectives in international business, this study aims to explain the ownership and market entry strategies of emerging country multinational enterprises (MNE) in a transition country. To this end, the Turkish MNEs' ownership (joint venture...

With a growing integration via trade and investment, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that have traditionally been oriented towards domestic markets increasingly compete with private firms in the global market place. Three principal questions emerge from the international trade perspective: (1)...

There are two main sources of confusion in the public corporate governance debate. One is the confusion about the role of public policy intervention. The other is a lack of empirical knowledge about the corporate landscape where rules are supposed to be implemented and the functioning of...

In family firms, the succession of controlling equity stake to next generation is an issue of paramount importance. This, however, can be a major challenge in the presence of heavy inheritance or gift tax burden (high tax rate and absence of tax-saving vehicles, such as trusts or foundations)...

This paper provides a framework for analysing the character and degree of ownership engagement by institutional investors. It argues that the general term “institutional investor” in itself doesn’t say very much about the quality or degree of ownership engagement. It is therefore an...

This paper examines how the distribution of target ownership is related with takeover premium in owner-manager dominant acquisitions, in which a firm is managed by managers and directors nominated and directed closely by controlling shareholders. We find that there exists the agency problem...