"We show that grandfathering fishing rights to local users or recognizing first possessions is more dynamically efficient than auctions of such rights. It is often argued that auctions allocate rights to the highest-valued users and thereby maximize resource rents. We counter that rents are not...

The authors argue that efficient water allocation is possible through markets as long as water rights are well-defined, enforced, and transferable. They provide a framework for considering third-party and free rider affects from water trades. From this framework, they consider the prospects for...

In the face of growing pressure on our natural landscapes and increasingly bitter conflict over their management and use, simply defending the status quo is not enough. Finding a balance between producing commodities, such as lumber, and maintaining amenities, such as open space, is crucial if...

1. Why the crisis? -- 2. Cheaper than dirt -- 3. Who owns the water? -- 4. Water is for fightin' -- 5. Back to the future -- 6. The new frontier -- 7. Buy that fish a drink -- 8. Good to the last drop -- 9. The race to pump -- 10. You can't keep a good market down.

We show that grandfathering fishing rights to local users or recognizing first possessions is more dynamically efficient than auctions of such rights. It is often argued that auctions allocate rights to the highest-valued users and thereby maximize resource rents. We counter that rents are not...