We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved...

We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved...

The division of a cake by two players is modelled by means of a game of timing in which the players have a probability of learning when their opponent acts. It is shown that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium when both players are non-noisy but that there are many Nash equilibria including...

The division of a cake by two players is modelled by means of a game of timing in which the players have a probability of learning when their opponent acts. It is shown that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium when both players are non-noisy but that there are many Nash equilibria including...

This book is on applications of game theory. It contains a lot of examples of applications of game theory together with the background of those games considered and a list of unsolved problems. Also we consider only the game where the optimal strategies of the players are found in closed form....

We introduce a search game in which a hider has partial information about a searcher's resource. The hider can be a terrorist trying to hide and the searcher can be special forces trying to catch him. The terrorist does not know the number of forces involved in the search but just its...