We construct a concrete example of an exchange economy which admits no equilibria in the presence of price-dependent consumption externalities. In our example, agents form a finite atomless measure space . A reference coalition of each agent t at a price system p is the subset C(t,p)[subset of]T...

Our major objective is to show that if there are infinitely many alternatives and society can be decomposed into the sum of two non-negligible coalitions, the set of all Arrovian collective choice rules that satisfy the ultrafilter property (its set of decisive coalitions form an ultrafilter),...

Carmona considered an increasing sequence of finite games in each of which players are characterized by payoff functions that are restricted to vary within a uniformly equicontinuous set and choose their strategies from a common compact metric strategy set. Then Carmona proved that each finite...

Recently, Askoura et al. (2013) proved the nonemptiness of the α-core of a finite Bayesian game GR with Young measure strategies and nonatomic type spaces, without requiring that the expected payoffs be concave. Under the same hypotheses as theirs, we demonstrate that Scarf’s method (1971)...