Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz et al. (Games Econ Behav 77:100–121, <CitationRef CitationID="CR13">2013a</CitationRef>), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from...</citationref>

Given that over half the revenues of global newspaper publishing come from advertising (80% in the US and 57% in OECD countries, OECD, 2010), we study how media firms internalize the effect of their own coverage on advertisers' sales and hence on their own advertising revenues. We show, within a...

We consider competitive markets with asymmetric information. We define a notion of equilibrium that allows individuals to act strategically both as buyers and as sellers. In an example, the wage is common to all types of labor, and it does not reveal information concerning the skill levels of...