Similar Search Results

First do no harm : the impact of financial incentives on dental X-rays

Chalkley, Martin; Listl, Stefan - In: Journal of health economics 58 (2018), pp. 1-9

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011999255

Editorial of special issue "Industrial organisation of the health sector and public policy"

Chalkley, Martin; Cremer, Helmuth; Siciliani, Luigi - In: Journal of health economics 50 (2016), pp. 256-257

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011589093

Special issue title: the economics of the Middle East and North Africa

Cobham, David P. (ed.); Chalkley, Martin (ed.) - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012821354

Third party purchasing of health services: Patient choice and agency

Chalkley, Martin; Khalil, Fahad - In: Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 6, pp. 1132-1153

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005204431

Use it or lose it

Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Lawarree, Jacques - In: Journal of Public Economic Theory 21 (2019) 6, pp. 991-1016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012094766

Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard

Chakraborty, Indranil; Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques - In: The RAND Journal of Economics 52 (2021) 1, pp. 179-206

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012536538

Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy J. - In: The Rand journal of economics 46 (2015) 4, pp. 872-890

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011482296

Learning from failures : optimal contracts for experimentation and production

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Rodivilov, Alexander - In: Journal of economic theory 190 (2020), pp. 1-44

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547184

The impacts of intellectual property rights protection on cross-border M&As

Hasan, Iftekhar; Khalil, Fahad; Sun, Xian - In: The quarterly journal of finance 7 (2017) 3, pp. 1-35

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011774135

Auditing Without Commitment

Khalil, Fahad - In: RAND Journal of Economics 28 (1997) 4, pp. 629-640

I study the optimal contract when a principal cannot commit to an audit. The contract must provide incentives for the agent to comply as well as for the principal to audit. The key tradeoff is efficiency versus noncompliance instead of the familiar rent versus efficiency. Information rent is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353814