Fried (in Public Choise, this issue, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2013</CitationRef>) claims that Quesada (in Public Choise 130:395–400, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">2007</CitationRef>) is wrong in showing that the dictator in a dictatorial social welfare function does not necessarily enjoy absolute decision power. This reply revisits, and illustrates by means of an example,...</citationref></citationref>

For the case of two alternatives and a given finite set of at least three individuals, seven axioms are shown to characterize the rules that are either the relative majority rule or the relative majority in which a given individual, the chairman, can always break ties. An axiomatization of the...

If, for strict preferences, a unique choice function (CF) is used to aggregate preferences position-wise then the resulting social welfare function (SWF) is dictatorial. This suggests that the task performed by non-dictatorial SWFs must be “more complex” than just selecting an alternative...

Voting operators map n-tuples of subsets of a given set X of candidates (the voters’ choices) into subsets of X (the social choice). This paper characterizes dictatorial voting operators by means of three conditions (the non-emptiness condition A1, the independence condition A2 and the...

For the case of strict preferences, a measure of a voter’s average power in a dictatorial social welfare function is defined making the dictator never have more average power than three voters and, as the number of voters grows, making the dictator average power converge to the average power...