It has recently been suggested in the agency literature that moral hazard in teams can be dealt with by introducing a third party who breaks the budget-balancing constraint, and that this facilitates the design of contracts that can sustain the Pareto optimum as a (perfect) Nash equilibrium....

This paper addresses the question: why does capital typically hire labor rather than the other way around? It models a situation in which a capitalist (owner of money capital) can choose between lending out his capital for production and using it to set up production under his own supervision....

This paper investigates how access to credit might impinge on risk behavior. It demonstrates that credit, by facilitating the pooling of risk across time, renders a risk-averse individual more capable of absorbing risk. Some implications of this result--mainly for developing economies--are then...

We offer a theory of gender differences in parental altruism based on the asymmetry that female fertility is constrained but male fertility is relatively unconstrained. Modelling human preferences as having been shaped during the Pleistocene, we derive evolutionarily stable, co-evolved male and...