Punishment can lose its legitimacy if the enforcer can profit from delivering punishment. We examine how justification can promote the legitimacy of punishment in a one-shot sender-receiver game where an independent third party can punish the sender upon seeing whether the sender lied. Most...

This paper adds to the economic-psychological research on tax compliance by experimentally testing a simple auditing rule that induces strategic uncertainty among taxpayers. Under this rule, termed the bounded rule, taxpayers are informed of the maximum number of audits by a tax authority, so...

In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.

Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group decisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of intergroup versus interindividual decision-making by running both one-shot and repeated sessions...

In medicine and health sciences mixed effects models are often used to study time-structured data. Optimal designs for such studies have been shown useful to improve the precision of the estimators of the parameters. However, optimal designs for such studies are often derived under the...