We discuss large but finite linear market games which are represented as minima of finitely many measures. These games describe markets in which the agents decompose into finitely many disjoint groups each of which holds a corner of the market. Most solution concepts like the core, the Shapley...

Ch 0: Preliminaries -- 1. Introductory remarks -- 2. Notations and Definitions -- CH I: Convex Games -- 1. Representation -- 2. Extreme points of ¢1 -- 3. Extreme games and the core -- CH II: Superadditive Games -- 1. Representation -- 2. Extreme points of $ 1 -- 3. Solutions of extreme...

Game Theory: Stochastics, Information, Strategies and Cooperation provides a discussion of some relevant topics in game theory. It is composed partially from material compiled by Professor Joachim Rosenmüller when lecturing at IMW, the Institute of Mathematical Economics at the University of...

A Cephoid is an algebraic ("Minkowski") sum of finitely many prisms in ℝn. A cephoidal game is an NTU game the feasible sets of which are cephoids. We provide a version of the Shapley NTU value for such games based on the bargaining solution of Maschler–Perles. The value is characterized by...

We describe a financial market as a noncooperative game in strategic form. Agents may borrow or deposit money at a central bank and use the cash available to them in order to purchase a commodity for immediate consumption. They derive positive utility from consumption and from having cash...