The paper examines under what conditions vertically differentiated duopolists engage in first-degree price discrimination. Each firm decides on a pricing regime at a first stage and sets prices at a second stage. The paper shows that when unit cost is an increasing and convex function of...

The paper examines under what conditions vertically differentiated duopolists engage in first-degree price discrimination. Each firm decides on a pricing regime at a first stage and sets prices at a second stage. The paper shows that when unit cost is an increasing and convex function of...

This paper investigates why, under supply control by a marketing board, production quota originally given to downstream producers may ultimately end up in the hands of the latters' upstream suppliers who will lease them back to their original owners. A link between the extent of leasing and the...

Restricting the trade of quota among firms in supply-managed sectors of agricultural benefits large producers whose unit costs are in the middle range of the cost distribution in their industry. This result is due to the fact that quantity regulation is accompanied by controls on the wholesale...