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Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

The condition for when a price control increases consumer welfare in perfect competition is tighter than often realised. When demand is linear, a small restriction on price only increases consumer surplus if the elasticity of demand exceeds the elasticity of supply; with log-linear or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976788

The Pricing of Art and the Art of Pricing: Pricing Styles in the Concert Industry

Courty, Pascal; Pagliero, Mario - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We document the existence of pricing styles in the concert industry. Artists differ in the extent to which they rely on second- and third-degree price discrimination and in how likely they are to sell out concerts. Most strikingly, artists who use multiple seating categories are more likely to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084535

An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing

Gilbert, Richard; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1993

Setting a price that results in rationing may be optimal for a seller whose customers must make a specific investment … to be able to use his product. Although rationing results in <MI>ex post<D> inefficiency, the resulting distribution of … higher profits than with market-clearing prices. Committing to a single price, and rationing if there is excess demand, can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788950

Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources

Condorelli, Daniele - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 582-591

A number of identical objects is allocated to a set of privately informed agents. Agents have linear utility in money. The designer wants to assign objects to agents that possess specific traits, but the allocation can only be conditioned on the willingness to pay and on observable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719488

Chapter 13. The Pricing of Art and the Art of Pricing: Pricing Styles in the Concert Industry

Courty, Pascal; Pagliero, Mario - In: Handbook of the economics of art and culture : volume 2, (pp. 299-356). 2014

We document the existence of pricing styles in the concert industry. Artists differ in the extent to which they rely on second- and third-degree price discrimination, and in the probability of their concerts selling out. Most strikingly, artists who use multiple seating categories are more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025401

Voluntary versus enforced team effort

Keser, Claudia; Montmarquette, Claude - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 277-301

We present a model where each of two players chooses between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the equilibrium strategy to choose private remuneration, we frequently observe both players to choose team remuneration in a series of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752421

Resolving persistent uncertainty by self-organized consensus to mitigate market bubbles

Sornette, Didier; Andraszewicz, Sandra; Murphy, Ryan O.; … - 2016

We propose a new paradigm to study coordination in complex social systems, such as financial markets, that accounts for fundamental uncertainty. This new context has features from prediction markets that have been shown previously to mitigate price bubbles in classical asset market experiments....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514493

A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504682

Carbon auctions, energy markets & market power: An experimental analysis

Dormady, Noah C. - In: Energy Economics 44 (2014) C, pp. 468-482

This paper provides an experimental analysis of a simultaneous energy-emissions market under conditions of market power. The experimental design employs real-world institutional features; including stochastic demand, permit banking, inter-temporal (multi-round) dynamics, a tightening cap, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011100086

Trust and financial trades: Lessons from an investment game where reciprocators can hide behind probabilities

Vranceanu, Radu; Sutan, Angela; Dubart, Delphine - In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics … 41 (2012) 1, pp. 72-78

This paper shows that if a very small, exogenously given probability of terminating the exchange is introduced in an elementary investment game, more reciprocators will choose the defection strategy. Everything happens as if they “hide behind probabilities” in order to break the trust...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011120405