Each period, a principal must assign one of two agents to a new task. Each agent privately learns whether he is qualified for the task. An agent wishes to be chosen independently of qualification and chooses whether to apply for the task. The principal wishes to appoint the most qualified agent...

Bounded rationality theories are typically characterized over exhaustive data sets. We develop a methodology to understand the empirical content of such theories with limited data, adapting the classic revealed‐preference approach to new forms of revealed information. We apply our approach to...

We propose a model of history-dependent risk attitude, allowing a decision maker's risk attitude to be affected by his history of disappointments and elations. The decision maker recursively evaluates compound risks, classifying realizations as disappointing or elating using a threshold rule. We...

We consider a multilateral Nash demand game in which short-sighted players come to the bargaining table with requests for both coalition partners and the potentially generated resource. We prove that the resulting process converges with probability one to a state in which all players agree on a...