Inflation-targeting regimes (like those of New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Sweden) are interpreted as having explicit inflation targets and implicit employment targets. Without employment persistence, an 'inflation-target-conservative' central bank eliminates the inflation bias,...

The authors present a new solution to the time-consistency problem that appears capable of enforcing ex ante policy i n settings where other enforcement mechanisms do not work. The soluti on involves a social contract that specifies the optimal ex ante poli cy and is effectively sold by...

A time-varying stochastic devaluation risk is introduced in a model of exchange rate target zones. The model produces realistic patterns of covariation between exchange rates and interest rate differentials, which previous target zone models have been unable to do. A 'drift adjustment' method to...

The problem of time inconsistency arises from two different sources. First, as shown by Guillermo A. Calvo (1978), the re is an incentive for each government to engage in an initial unanti cipated inflation. Second, as discussed by Robert E. Lucas and Nancy L. Stokey (1983), there is an...

The paper argues that real world fixed exchange rate regimes usually have finite bands instead of completely fixed exchange rates between realignments because exchange rate bands, contrary to the textbook result, give central banks some monetary independence even with free international capital...