[eng] Universal Service Obligations and Competition in Networks.. The opening of public networks to competition raises the twofold question of determining which operator is to fulfil the universal service obligations and how the operator’s resultant losses are to be financed. The paper...

Heterogeneity is an important determinant of the shape of optimal tax schemes. This is shown here in a model a la Mirrlees. The agents differ in their productivities and opportunity costs of work, but their labor supplies depend only on a given unidimensional combination of these two...

We modelize a free price competition between a vertically integrated incumbent operating as an upstream monopolist in an essential facility and facing competition as service provider. The incumbent determines freely the access charge to its network. We determine conditions for which the...

Academic literature in public finance has focused on interjurisdictional tax competition—namely among similar types of local governments—but has leaved vertical externalities arising from interactions between two overlapping governments sharing the same tax base aside. The purpose of this...

[eng] Within a vertical relationship between a producer and a retailer we study each side’s incentives to certify the quality of a product. Without certification, consumers are not informed about quality. We show that this certification issue generates new conflicts between producer and...