Altruistic punishment may promote cooperation, but can also lead to costly feuds. We examine how the threat of feuds affects individuals' willingness to engage in altruistic punishment in a public good experiment in which the number of stages is determined by participants' actions. The design...

Abstract We resume the search for a collusive focal-point effect of price ceilings in laboratory markets. We argue that market conditions in previous studies were unfavorable for collusion which may have been responsible for not finding such a focal-point effect. Our design aims at maximizing...

no abstract available.

We present a striking example of the deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly. In line with previous experiments we show in a one-shot setting that the allegedly robust false consensus effect disappears if representative information is readily available. But the effect reappears if a...

Optimal voting rules have to be adjusted to the underlying distribution of preferences. However, in practice there usually is no social planner who can perform this task. This paper shows that the introduction of a stage at which agents may themselves choose voting rules according to which they...

Preferences over income distribution are the basis for a variety of models that aim at explaining results in economic experiments. The direct evidence concerning these preferences, however, is limited to a relatively small set of games. The authors discuss crucial evidence, including that from a...

Several authors have made attempts to improve the explanatory power of models of inequality aversion, in particular the one by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), by adding concerns for total surplus or efficiency. In this note, I point out that these attempts are misguided because they are equivalent to a...