In this paper, we analyse if individual inequality aversion measured with simple experimental games depends on whether the monetary endowment in these games is either a windfall gain (“house money”) or a reward for a certain effort-related performance. We then examine whether the way of...

This paper presents a means of fostering efficient coordination in minimum effort coordination games, inter-group competition. In a series of laboratory experiments, we reveal that the true reason for coordination failure is strategic uncertainty, which can be reduced almost completely by...

The book is dedicated to the use of genetic algorithms in theoretical economic research. Genetic algorithms offer the chance of overcoming the limitations traditional mathematical tractability puts on economic research and thus open new horzions for economic theory. The book reveals close...

Recent literature shows that learning in oligopoly games might in the long run result in the Cournot or in the Walrasian equilibrium. Which outcome is achieved seems to depend on the underlying learning dynamics. This paper analyzes the forces behind the learning mechanisms determining the...

This paper explores the question whether boundedly rational agents learn to behave optimally when asked to voluntarily contribute to a public good. The dynamic game is described by an Evolutionary Algorithm, which is shown to extend the applicability of ordinary replicator dynamics of...

Technical analysis, also known as "charting", has been a part of financial practice for many decades, yet little academic research has been devoted to a systematic evaluation of this discipline. One of the main obstacles is the highly subjective nature of technical analysis---the presence of...