This paper investigates the efficiency of household investment decisions in a unique dataset containing the disaggregated wealth and income of the entire population of Sweden. The analysis focuses on two main sources of inefficiency in the financial portfolio: underdiversification of risky...

We introduce a neoclassical growth economy with idiosyncratic production risk and incomplete markets. Each agent is an entrepreneur operating her own neoclassical technology with her own capital stock. The general equilibrium is characterized in closed form. Idiosyncratic production shocks...

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No abstract received.

The paper deals with standard mathematical models for nonlinear affine control systems with two (vector-valued) inputs u (=control) and w (unknown except for a bound for the sup-norm). Interpretation of this scenario and its wide range of applications (in control and differential game theory):...

Consider the cooperative coalition games with side payments. Bargaining sets are calculated for all possible coalition structures to obtain a collection of imputations rather than single imputation. Our aim is to obtain a single payoff vector, which is acceptable by all players of the game under...

In many share problems there is an a priori given a natural set of possible divisions to solve the sharing problem. Cooperative games related to such share sets are introduced, which may be helpful in solving share problems. Relations between properties of share sets and properties of games are...

Under dynamic cooperation a player may use 'irrational' acts to extort additional gains if later circumstances allow. In this article we present a condition under which even if irrational behaviors appear later in the game the concerned player would still be performing better under the...

The literature on normal form games generally depicts the payoff matrices of two or three players. However, many such games discuss n-players. Therefore, this note studies the payoff representations of n-player normal form games.

In this paper we introduce two simple versions of the hat game for three players and a generalization for n players. We compute the extensive version of the game and all the equilibrium and friendly equilibrium points as a simple example of the structure function.