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Lotteries and Lindahl prices in public good provision

Franke, Jörg; Leininger, Wolfgang - In: Journal of Public Economic Theory 20 (2018) 6, pp. 840-848

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012094695

Self-enforcing norms and the efficient non-cooperative organization of clans

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003493306

Lottery versus all-pay auction contests : a revenue dominance theorem

Franke, Jörg; Kanzow, Christian; Leininger, Wolfgang; … - 2012

We allow a contest organizer to bias a contest in a discriminatory way, that is, she can favor specific contestants through the choice of contest success functions in order to maximize total equilibrium effort (resp. revenue). The scope for revenue enhancement through biasing is analyzed and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009579412

Economics without borders : economic research for European policy challenges

Blundell, Richard W. (ed.); Cantillon, Estelle (ed.); … - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011633980

Lotteries and Lindahl prices in public good provision

Franke, Jörg; Leininger, Wolfgang - In: Journal of public economic theory 20 (2018) 6, pp. 840-848

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012113723

Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation : entry, effort and overdissipation

Gu, Yiquan; Hehenkamp, Burkhard; Leininger, Wolfgang - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 164 (2019), pp. 469-485

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012145201

Asymmetric oligopoly and evolutionary stability

Leininger, Wolfgang; Moghadam, Hamed M. - In: Mathematical social sciences 96 (2018), pp. 1-9

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012130821

Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests

Franke, Jörg; Leininger, Wolfgang; Wasser, Cédric - In: European economic review : EER 104 (2018), pp. 22-37

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011975698

Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants

Franke, Jörg; Kanzow, Christian; Leininger, Wolfgang; … - In: Economic Theory 52 (2013) 2, pp. 589-630

Contest rules are set up by administrators who frequently have discretionary power in specifying the details of these rules, i.e., they can bias the contest rules toward specific contestants in order to further their prime objective. We derive the optimal bias of the contest rule for a contest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993615

Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games

Leininger, Wolfgang - In: Economic Theory 29 (2006) 3, pp. 713-719

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371146