Abstract The internal organization of large firms as well as procurement and regulation contexts frequently involve a hierarchical nexus of contracts, with substantial delegation of decision making across layers. Such hierarchical delegation of decision making creates problems of aligning...

The internal organization of large firms as well as procurement and regulation contexts frequently involve a hierarchical nexus of contracts, with substantial delegation of decision making across layers. Such hierarchical delegation of decision making creates problems of aligning incentives of...

Agents in a hierarchy are commonly delegated authority to communicate and contract with agents at lower levels. While delegation reduces the burden of communication and information processing on the principal, it also introduces additional incentive problems. We find that with sufficient...

Consider the problem of Bayesian implementation, i.e., of constructing mechanisms with the property that all Bayesian equilibrium outcomes agree with a given choice rule. The authors show that a general procedure is to start with an incentive-compatible revelation mechanism, and then augment...

This paper studies how land reform and population growth affect land inequality and landlessness, focusing particularly on indirect effects owing to their influence on household divisions and land market transactions. Theoretical predictions of a model of household division and land transactions...