Similar Search Results

Single versus multiple-prize all-pay auctions to finance public goods: An experimental analysis

Faravelli, Marco; Stanca, Luca - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81 (2012) 2, pp. 677-688

This paper presents an experimental comparison of single and multiple-prize all-pay auctions as fundraising mechanisms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573026

Economic incentives and social preferences: Causal evidence of non-separability

Faravelli, Marco; Stanca, Luca - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 (2014) C, pp. 273-289

This paper investigates the hypothesis that the objective function of economic agents is non-separable in economic incentives and social preferences. We study fixed-prize contests in a 2×2 experimental design, varying orthogonally the degree of competition of the incentive mechanism (all-pay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116886

When less is more: Rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests

Faravelli, Marco; Stanca, Luca - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 170-183

This paper shows how to maximize revenue when a contest is noisy. We consider a case where two or more contestants bid for a prize in a stochastic contest where all bidders value the prize equally. We show that, whenever a Tullock contest yields under-dissipation, the auctioneerʼs revenue can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049893

The price of warm glow

Lilley, Andrew; Slonim, Robert - In: Journal of Public Economics 114 (2014) C, pp. 58-74

This paper presents a model and experimental evidence to explain the “volunteering puzzle” where agents prefer volunteering time to donating money when monetary donations are, ceteris paribus, more efficient for providing resources to charity. In the model agents receive heterogeneous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056150

An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence

Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360336

Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities

Hu, Youxin; Kagel, John; Xu, Xiaoshu; Ye, Lixin - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 269-291

-price auctions, regular bidders bid more aggressively than the “entrant” and both bid higher than in auctions with no externality …. Predictions regarding revenue, efficiency, and successful entry between the two auctions are satisfied. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049770

Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values

McGee, Peter - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 312-326

Auctions are often used to sell idiosyncratic goods difficult for potential bidders to value ex ante. Laboratory … auctions with uncertainty over final values in this experiment resulted in 18% and 27% of bids above the expected value of the … item in private-value first-price and English auctions, respectively. Risk-seeking preferences as measured on an individual …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049854

Estimation of the house money effect using hurdle models

Engel, Christoph; Moffat, Peter G. - 2012

Evidence from an experiment investigating the "house money effect" in the context of a public goods game is reconsidered. Analysis is performed within the framework of the panel hurdle model, in which subjects are assumed to be one of two types: free-riders, and potential contributors. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569530

Gender effects and third-party punishment in social dilemma games

Di Cagno, Daniela; Drouvelis, Michalis; Paiardini, Paola - 2017

This paper investigates whether altruistic punishment when cooperation norms are violated is sensitive to gender effects. Our framework is a one-shot social dilemma game with third-party punishment in which subjects are informed of the others' gender within their group. This allows us to test...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010204

Conditioning on what? Heterogeneous contributions and conditional cooperation

Hartig, Björn; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Kölle, Felix - In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics … 55 (2015) C, pp. 48-64

We experimentally investigate how different information about others’ individual contributions affects conditional cooperators’ willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual contributions is provided, contributions are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011264260

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last