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The combinatorial clock auction is becoming increasingly popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950813
Economic theory is often abused in practical policy-making. There is frequently excessive focus on sophisticated theory at the expense of elementary theory; too much economic knowledge can sometimes be a dangerous thing. Too little attention is paid to the wider economic context, and to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498003
An unprecedented “boom and bust” investment cycle occurred in the high-tech industries at the turn of the century, in particular in the telecommunications sector. Regulatory reforms and technological innovation fuelled expectations of robust growth in traffic, revenue and earnings....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005045838
This paper reviews the part played by economists in organizing the British third-generation mobile-phone licence auction that concluded on 27 April 2000. It raised £22½ billion ($34 billion or 2½ % of GNP) and was widely described at the time as the biggest auction ever. We discuss the merits...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661794
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European ‘third generation’ (3G, or ‘MTS’) mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the UK, though the values of the licences sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662052
The design of the Federal Communications Commission spectrum license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory. Auction theory helped address policy questions such as whether an open auction or a sealed-bid auction should be used; whether the licenses should be auctioned...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005560850
We use a classroom game, the ‘Wallet Game’, to show that in standard ascending, i.e. English, auctions of close-to-common-values objects, even slight asymmetries between bidders can have very large effects on prices. Examples of small asymmetries are a small value advantage for one bidder or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791269
This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and 'standard' economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792157
Europe has taken the global lead in the issuance of third generation (3G) licences for mobile telecommunications according to the UMTS/IMT-2000 family of standards. We survey the recent European UMTS licence auctions and compare their outcomes with the predictions of a simple auction model that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792176
The design of the FCC spectrum-license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory. Auction theory helped address policy questions such as: Should an open auction or a sealed-bid auction be used? Should the licenses be auctioned sequentially or simultaneously? Should the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005563024