We analyze the legal reform concerning employees' inventions in Germany. Using a simple principal-agent model, we derive a unique efficient payment scheme: a bonus which is contingent on the project value. We demonstrate that the old German law creates inefficient incentives. However, the new...

Standardization is a process through which potential rivals cooperate to have the best technological solution adopted as the next standard. They pool together financial, human and material resources. Intellectual property rights, especially patents, are a powerful tool for them to recover...

This article describes how the Court of Justice of the European Union, with its Huawei v ZTE ruling in July 2015, has attempted to prevent abuses from SEP-holders (hold-ups) and implementers (hold-outs) by balancing the interests of both sides. This decision establishes a contractual negotiation...

Abstract This paper demonstrates that credit constraints can lead to the inability to enforce contracts, thereby creating inefficiency. If time elapses between the contract period and the enforcement period, a credit constrained agent that uses the proceeds of trade to fund consumption faces a...

This paper explores the hold-up problem between two parties (an entrepreneur and an investor) when one of the parties (the entrepreneur) is unable to commit not to repudiate the initial contract. To mitigate hold-up we allow the parties to stage investments over time and derive the optimal...